



Contemporary Chinese Law: Research Problems and Perspectives.
Edited by Jerome Alan Cohen. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard
University Press, 1970. Pp. 380. $13.50.
Unless it is coordinated by stern editorial control, a collection of
essays on research problems and perspectives tends to spread itself out
along a spectrum. Some of the essays will exhibit methods of research
rather than discuss them; some will present substantive conclusions,
free of the documentation with which an openly substantive paper
might have had to be encumbered; some will ascend from substance
and method to the high dry ground of methodology. Still others may
contain little more than inventories of the tools of research. When the
unifying topic is the law of a far-off land with an immense early
literature and difficult literacy, there is the additional opportunity of
dwelling on problems of translation and the relationship between
policy and language.
So it is with this collection.1 Of the fourteen contributions, four are
mainly or partly bibliographical,2 devoted respectively to work pub-
lished on Chinese law in China, Japan, the Soviet Union, and the
United States or Western Europe. Three are centered on the language
of individual legal terms: one on Japanese influences, one on Com-
munist China's criminal law, one on Chinese terms in international
law.3 Two are devoted to problems of interviewing refugees.4 One,
though offered as a discussion of a problem in translation, amounts to
a careful case study of a substantive problem in marriage law and
t William K. Townsend Professor of Law, Yale University.
1. CoNTEMroRARY CHINESE LAW: RESEARCH PROBLEMS AND PERSPEcrIVES (J. Cohen et.
1970) [hereinafter cited to page number only].
2. By Tao-tai Hsia, Yasuhei Taniguchi, George Ginsburgs, and Jerome Cohen (intro.
duction).
3. Respectively by Dan Fenno Henderson, David Finkelstein and Hungdah Chlu.
4. By Jerome Cohen and Victor Li. One would have welcomed some cross-commentary
by each on the other's experiences.
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governmental policy.; Four show us views of Chinese law from different
outside "perspectives": Chinese and United States attitudes to criminal
law and to international law, attitudes of Japanese writers to Chinese
law, and Soviet attitudes to Chinese law.0 Another considers Chinese
Communist civil law against a background of certain ideas in legal and
social-science theory.7
One who seeks from this volume an idea of the way Chinese law
works-the modes of thought, the style of official behavior, the sources
and resources (except in the bibliographical sense)-will not find much
to the point, though several of the authors have had their say on this
subject in other publications. Jerome Cohen makes one relevant com-
ment to the effect that the Uniting for Peace resolution, put through
the United Nations General Assembly in 1950, was "a significant
departure from the original understanding of the United Nations
Charter and one which could not square with the PRO's [People's Re-
public of China] fundamentalist principles of constitutional interpreta-
tion."s One would have liked to see some other evidence of those
fundamentalist principles, even after setting to one side the substantive
question of international constitutional law. If Chinese principles of
constitutional interpretation are indeed fundamentalist, they offer a
sharp contrast with the celebrated intricacy of many of the wriggles in
the Sino-Soviet polemic, with the Communist Chinese position on the
old treaties defining the Sino-Indian borders, and with the astuce
deployed by Communist Chinese leaders in the public parts of their
internal factional arguments.
Richard M. Pfeffer's essay on crime and punishment shows an
endeavor to weld Franz Schurmann on organizations/ideology/politics
with Lon L. Fuller on criteria of legality. Pfeffer is right, I think, when
he suggests (or so I read him) that from the existence of regularity one
may infer the existence not of a just system but just of a system. He
appears, however, to believe that he has accomplished more: that is,
that he has called into question the applicability of a description of
5. By Marinus J. Mfeijer. Two of the essays give contrasting glimpses of official morality
of the People's Republic of China: Mfeijer's, on state interference with marriage (pp. 216-29).
and Finkelstein's, on legal terms referring to procedural safeguards (pp. 192-93). One cannot
tell whether the relative delicacy of the first is due to differences in subject matter, time,
or the eye of the beholder. For a rather different comparison, consider the resemblance
between the Chinese Communist attitude to sanctions or failure to register a marriage
(feijer, 228-29) and to the enforcement of commercial contracts in the event of non-
performance (Lubman, p. 255). One wonders how they stand on breach-of-promise actions.
6. By Richard Pfeffer (criminal), Jerome Cohen (international), Yasuhel Taniguchi
(Japanese), Harold Berman (Soviet).
7. By Stanley Lubman.
8. P. 288.
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Chinese criminal process which it is clear he believes is not the whole
or only truth.9 On the one hand, he furnishes neither sub- nor in-
stantiation. Perhaps that is to be explained by the character of the
book as a home for essays on, not of, research. On the other hand, per-
haps he means that we ought to understand terms like "ad hoc,"
"administrative rather than judicial institutions," "heavily inquisi-
torial, generally ex parte," "no independent judiciary," and "domi-
nated by the police, under strong Party control," with more or fewer
connotations than a lay reader would first bring to the reading of the
initial description.
Pfeffer returns to the problem of perspective after a critical excursus
(via those uneasy mates, Packer and Skolnick) into myths and realities
in the American criminal process. It says something (though it is not
Pfeffer who says it) about the criminal process in the two societies
that Pfeffer furnishes fewer factual citations to the Chinese material
than to the American material; his mirror has more detail than his
window does. (When you can't be positive and refuse to be superlative,
then go comparative?)
Cohen's essay on Chinese and American attitudes to international
law has more color and shows more energy than most of the other
(including his other) contributions to the volume. He shares with
Pfeffer the "reflectiveness" of a plea for perspective, trying to take the
American reader out of his American skin for long enough to imagine
how it might feel to wear another one. The reflection is tinged with
strong hostility to Chiang, the Kuomintang, and the Republic of
China. Cohen's intention seems to have been partly to point out
similarities between Communist and KMT behavior, but also partly to
suggest that Americans, having backed a horse that deserved to lose,
deserved to suffer the consequences of their error.
Several of the contributions touch on the relationship between
Soviet law and the law of the PRC. Different sides of that relationship
face still other questions, many of which have considerable political
9. P. 261:
Laws in China not infrequently are applied retroactively and analogically or, to
put it most crudely, on an ad hoc basis. Application of what we would classify as
criminal law, especially of the law of minor crimes, tends to be by administrative
rather than judicial institutions. Even where nominally judicial institutions are
employed, as is the case with major crimes, their style is heavily inquisitorial, gen-
erally ex parte, with little opportunity for the defendant to defend himself either
directly or through a lawyer. The proceedings of these institutions are not public.
There is no independent judiciary and little separation of powers. The entire
criminal process in China today tends to be dominated by the police, under strong
Party control.
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and historical interest. For example, Professor Taniguchi's study of
Japanese studies of Chinese law suggests that in the past twenty years
Chinese Communist law has been regarded in Japan predominantly
from a (or some) Marxist point of view: whatever the PRO was doing
at the time of writing was not so much analyzed as celebrated. The
record seems both to illustrate the tendentiousness of much Marxist
scholarship and to take its place in the long and complex history of
mutual Sino-Japanese influence in politics and culture. (A companion-
piece might be written on the way in which American jurists (the
practitioners more than the scholars) wrote about Soviet law between,
say, 1950 and 1970. The Japanese Marxist seems to have been deter-
mined to praise whatever he found in Communist Chinese law; perhaps
some Americans were resolved, in similar superiority to the facts, to
praise or to blame as their political convictions impelled them.)
Now, as Taniguchi observes, Japanese study of Soviet law is begin-
ning to take on more varied nuances; this would appear to have some-
thing to do not just with growing familiarity, but also and even more
with the split in Japanese Marxism reflecting the Sino-Soviet split.
Taniguchi speculates that the "new trend... may eventually be dupli-
cated in the field of Chinese law." 10
When we turn to material on Soviet studies of Communist Chinese
law, we see a change taking place again in conformity with political
currents. Harold Berman calls our attention to Soviet studies of China
in the 1950's, when Big Brother patronized and advised. One misses,
however, discussion of a possibility no less plausible and no harder to
document than some of the conjectures Berman does convey. He notes
that, when Soviet legal writers wrote on Chinese developments in the
1950's and early 1960's (that is, between the Communist victory on the
mainland of China and the start of the open Sino-Soviet polemic), they
may have had in mind the adoption or adaptation of Chinese initiatives
by Soviet institutions, especially in the field of supervised popular
administration of justice (the non-courts)." What he does not mention
is the likelihood that at least some of the Soviet writing on China has
been intended not as a discussion of Soviet borrowing from China but
as an indirect polemic aimed at various indigenous trends in Soviet
law. Thus when a Soviet writer criticizes Chinese work on the pre-
sumption of innocence, he may intend to make obliquely points that
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sumption of innocence.1 2 During a period of agitation, however re-
strained and masked, for reform in the Soviet Union, Soviet criticism
of Chinese law could well have been read, and written, as being turned
inward. It was not, after all, considered a very abstruse cypher when
Party political writers in the Soviet Union abused "Albania" but meant
China and their opposite numbers in China abused "Yugoslavia" but
meant the Soviet Union.
Outside the camps of committed Marxists whose intellectual super-
structures are only as firm as their political bases, a difference of
emphasis has arisen between observers of China and observers of the
Soviet Union, in odd parallel to the differences that have arisen be-
tween the leaders of those states and parties. Russia-watchers have
tended, like Soviet writers in the mid-1950's, to see Chinese events as
following or deviating from a path trodden first by the Soviet Union;
unlike Soviet writers, they were free to disapprove of the Soviet
direction and to approve or disapprove of the direction taken by the
Communist Chinese, but they often tend to argue from the Soviet
Union's chronological priority and military-industrial primacy to a
secondary status for China. Sinologues, heroically sustaining the weight
of Chinese tradition, culture, and history, and impressed at least
adequately by the need to amortize the investment they have made in
learning Chinese, tend rather to belittle the paradigmatic force of
Soviet experience for a country so exceptional as the Middle Kingdom.
When some new institution is developed, or an old one is discarded,
in the administration of Chinese law, the Sovietologists score it by
reflecting on a Marxist doctrine (however altered since Marx) or a
Soviet precedent; the Sinologues score it by reference to the crowded
storehouse of Chinese civilization. Some communication across the
specialties, of which this book affords a welcome partial example (par.
ticularly in the essays of Berman and Ginsburgs), has complicated the
pattern. Since the start of the Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the
mid-sixties, affected by refugees' accounts and perhaps also by the
drought of documentary flow, some China-watchers have commented
on Communist Chinese law or at least justice in terms that, often
12. Berman notes Soviet "attention" to Chinese criticism of the presumption of
innocence in his paragraph on the impatience and condescension shown as early as 1957 by
Soviet writing on Chinese law. Yet the explicit statement of the presumption of innocence
was, after long debate, rejected in the 1958-59 revision of the fundamentals of Soviet
criminal law. Some Soviet authors have contended that equivalent protection is afforded
by certain other provisions taken together, and by the general practice of Soviet organs
ofjustice. See Stephen M. Weiner, Socialist Legality on Trial, in IN QUEsr or JusTcmE: PijO-
rEST AND DISSENT IN THE SovIET U14ION TODAY 39, 43-44 (A. Brumberg ed. 1970).
1296
Vol. 80: 1292, 1971
Review
expressly, evoke Soviet law or justice of some earlier period. Two
things should be noted: first, the parallel may be rightly drawn though
causal influence is belittled; second, for the sake of sharpening the
contrast drawn between China today and Russia today, the magnitude
of change between Soviet law in the fifties and Soviet law today may be
overstated.
A few of the contributors, notably Cohen and Lubman, hint at the
connection between law and domestic politics. The Lubman essay
offers an attempt to relate this familiar insight to the civil law in some
detail. The trouble is that with sufficient ingenuity a case can be made
out for a political link if not a political cause for most legal events. In
this exercise the Western analyst of Chinese Communist, as of Soviet,
legal events has two advantages over analysts of looser polities: in the
first place he does not need so much ingenuity, and in the second he
has less information about non-political factors. This may be true also
of the Marxian singers of Chinese Communist law noted in Japan by
Professor Taniguchi, despite the centuries of Japanese familiarity with
many sides of Chinese culture.
One who writes about language throws stones from in front of his
glass house. David Finkelstein includes, among several examples of
"inconsistent and imprecisely used terminology" in which he says
Chinese legal material abounds, the following:
The words 'and' and 'or' are used in the language of Chinese
law as they are in the language of American law-indiscriminately
and interchangeably. In a discussion of mental illness, for in-
stance, one author writes: 'The person who has the capacity to
assume responsibility [for his acts] is a person who has the capacity
to understand the nature of and to control his own acts [empha-
sis added].' In other words, for a person to have that 'capacity' he
must have both elements, understanding and control. Yet the same
author then goes on to say that if a person 'was unable to under-
stand the nature of and control his own act [emphasis added],' he
should not be held responsible. Obviously, the latter 'and' must
be interpreted to mean 'or." 3
Finkelstein's obvious correction proceeds from his obvious mis-
understanding. The Chinese author's first statement maintains, as
Finkelstein says, that responsibility requires both capacity to under-
13. P. 199 (underlining and bracketed matter are Finkelstein's). Despite this lapse,
Finkelstein's essay deserves praise for a more analytical approach to the problems of
terminology than is shown in the sure- but flat-footed chapters contributed by Chiu and
Henderson.
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stand and capacity to control. The second statement maintains, as
Finkelstein does not say, that one who could not satisfy both require-
ments should not be held responsible. Whether or not that is good law
or good psychology, it is not bad logic or bad English, and if Finkel-
stein's translation is accurate it was not bad Chinese. Finkelstein must
have taken "was unable to understand the nature of and control his
own act" as if it had read "was unable to understand the nature of, and
was unable to control, his own act." But there is a difference between
(1) "unable to do A and do B" and (2) "unable to do A and unable
to do B." If (2) holds in a given case, then (1) does; but (1) may hold
even when (2) does not; e.g., when an actor is able to do A but is unable
to do B. Finkelstein's "obvious" interpretation, resting on a wrong
reading of (1) as equivalent to (2), leads him to substitute for (1) a
form (3), "unable to do A or do B," which would for the first time
import the very ambiguity he seeks to help the Chinese author to avoid.
Since the export and perhaps the production of primary or secondary
legal texts in the PRC has been so scant in recent years, legal scholars
resting upon traditional sources, whether or not applying traditional
methods to them, have been starved for material. Their plight recalls
the description given of a certain Latin American country a few years
ago by a student in a seminar on legal problems of development: he
said the country had a one-commodity economy that was running out
of its one commodity. A similar fate may be averted soon for the analyst
of technical Chinese law by the advent of new, though limited, possi-
bilities for contact and observation, though awkward and difficult. The
methods and perspectives discussed in this book will be supplemented,
but will not be out-dated.
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